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Abstract
Cyber-physical security describes the protection of systems with close relationships
between computational functions and physical ones and addresses the issue of vulnerability to
attack through both cyber and physical avenues. This describes systems in a wide variety of
functions, many crucial to the function of modern society, making their security of paramount
importance. The development of secure system design and attack detection strategies for each
potential avenue of attack is needed to combat malicious attacks. This thesis will provide an
overview of the approaches to securing different aspect of cyber-physical systems. The cyber
element can be designed to better prevent unauthorized entry and to be more robust to attack
while its use is evaluated for signs of ongoing intrusion. Nodes in sensor networks can be
evaluated by their claims to determine the likelihood of their honesty. Control systems can be
designed to be robust in cases of the failure of one component and to detect signal insertion or
replay attack. Through the application of these strategies, the safety and continued function of
cyber-physical systems can be improved.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Technological advances have greatly eased modern life, but as infrastructure becomes
increasingly dependent on technology, its vulnerability to malicious attack also grows. More and
more technological systems interface thoroughly with the physical world, leaving them
vulnerable not only to traditional cyber attacks but also to attacks through physical avenues.
Cyber-physical security as a field applies to systems with close relationships between
computational functions and physical ones, such as the example system shown in Figure 1.
Examples of cyber-physical systems include the smart grid, process control systems, air traffic
control systems, and medical monitoring. This applies to systems in a wide variety of functions,
many of great importance to the function of modern society. Attacks can occur through the
network, through replacement or control of sensors, or through providing false data to sensors by
manipulating the conditions at the sensor site.

Figure 1: Example diagram of a cyber-physical system. [Mitchell, 2013]
Attacks in control systems have been reported in electric power control systems, including
those for transmission, generation and distribution in fossil, gas turbine, and nuclear plants, and
in business such as water, oil and gas, chemicals, paper and agribusiness [Turk, 2005]. An attack
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on the communication system used by a railway company shut down all rail traffic in the
Washington, D.C. area, including morning commuter traffic, for twelve hours [Turk, 2005]. A
former consultant at a waste water plant in Queensland, Australia, used the system to release up
to 1 million liters of sewage into nearby waterways [Turk, 2005]. One of the most famous attacks
against a control system is the Stuxnet worm, a virus that affects specific Supervisory Control
and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems, and was allegedly used against nuclear facilities in
Iran. Stuxnet was designed to reprogram industrial centrifuges, leading them to failure while
remaining almost undetectable due to the replay data disguising the attack [Chabukswar, 2011].
Stuxnet continued to spread through the internet and through thumb drives, and its presence in
the United States was reported by Chevron in 2012 [Kushner, 2013]. Cyber–physical security
encompasses the detection of attacks against such systems and the design of these systems to
continue to function in the event of an attack. Replacement or control of sensors can be used in
attacks such as denial-of-service (DoS) attacks, which overload the system with requests to deny
access to users.
1.2 State of the Research Field
Research into cyber-physical security has become better prioritized as examples of wellpublicized cyber-physical attacks force industries and governments to recognize their
vulnerabilities. Many organizations were reluctant to report security incidents out of
embarrassment, and others denied that the risk even existed, believing that the distinctness of
their systems provided safety [Byrnes, 2004]. This was a reasonable conclusion prior to 2001,
when reported cyber incidents were largely the result of accidents or disgruntled employees
within a company, with only thirty-one percent resulting from outside attack [Byrnes, 2004]. A
huge shift in reported cyber attacks occurred in a short period, so that by 2003 seventy percent of
2

cyber attacks were external. These attacks made vulnerabilities previously unnoticed, especially
in industrial control systems, unavoidable. Attacks such as the Slammer Worm, in which a
common frame relay used for internet traffic as well as the power grid was overwhelmed,
blocking traffic to the substations, highlighted the vulnerability of modern infrastructure. As the
Slammer Worm showed, attacks occurring through the internet can impact even systems that
don’t use the internet for their function [Byrnes, 2004].
The cyber security field has many strategies for the defense from network attacks from
outsiders, but remains especially vulnerable to malicious attack by insiders and loss of function
due to denial-of-service attacks, to which there is no sufficient protection. Sensor network
security has a robust set of strategies for the determination of malicious nodes in ideal
conditions, but remains vulnerable to the ejection of honest nodes from the network resulting
from communication issues common in real world situations. Significant progress has been made
in the determination of the ideal controller in the presence of DoS attack but remains more
vulnerable to an attacker with an ideal attack strategy. Detection and design strategies for signal
insertion to control systems have been well developed, but control systems remain in large part
quite vulnerable to replay attack in that current detection strategies have a low success rate and
significant loss of function.
1.3 Outline of the Thesis
Cyber-physical security can be approached in a number of ways, and we will attempt to
divide these approaches by the avenue of attack which they seek to defend from. Chapter 2 will
outline the study of traditional cyber attacks, which remain of concern for cyber-physical
systems; even those not connected to a network can become vulnerable through carelessness on
the part of users. Design of the system through the correct use of keys and network topology can
3

help protect the system, as can the monitoring of system function for anomalous use indicative of
an incursion. Chapter 3 elaborates on the security of sensor networks; cyber physical systems
generally require sensors to gather physical data to perform their functions, leaving them
vulnerable to attacks which alter the environment, fool the sensor, or insert a false sensor into the
system. Through evaluation of the data provided by sensors across the network over time, the
reliability of individual sensors in the network can be evaluated. Chapter 4 discusses the
protection of control systems, which can be harmed through DoS attack, manipulated through the
insertion of malicious signals, and deceived through data readings used to disguise an attack.
Filters can be used to detect signal insertion, but defense against more complicated attacks
remain challenging.
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Chapter 2: Approaches to Cyber Security
2.1 Cyber Attacks
Cyber physical systems have many points of vulnerability due to the many components
that these systems employ. For instance, a smart grid system is particularly vulnerable to cyber
incursions due to the physically distributed nature of the system, leaving many entry points on
the consumer side such as meters or appliances physically vulnerable [Fadlullah, 2011]. With
entry points vulnerable to cyber attack from outsiders across the system and to the possibility of
misuse by system users, the pricing data, integrity of commands and software, and system
availability of the smart grid must be protected [Mo, 2012]. These attacks from entry points can
come in the form of infected devices, intrusion via a network such as the internet, preinstalled
vulnerabilities left during the supply chain, or a malicious insider. Network attacks have a
number of possible sources, including backdoors in the IT infrastructure, direct access to remote
terminal units, exploiting trusted peer utility links, or hijacking the Virtual Private Network
(VPN) connection employed by a legitimate user. Once an attacker is inside the system, it is
vulnerable in a range of ways, from more trivial attempts to reduce electricity prices to terrorist
attacks. Once the cyber-physical system has been infiltrated, the adversary’s access to the control
system has the potential for enormous physical consequences. In the case of a smart grid, an
attacker could cause widespread blackouts, putting lives in danger when elements of critical
infrastructure, such as hospitals or traffic lights, do not receive power. An example model of one
such smart grid network is shown in Figure 2. Attackers to such a system endanger the
confidentiality of system information, the integrity and the availability of the system information
and the system function to legitimate users [Mo, 2012].

5

Figure 2: Model of a smart grid's hierarchical network. [Fadlullah, 2011]
Another common type of cyber attack is a Denial of Service (DoS) attack, which brings
down a server or network by overloading the system with fake requests so that no resources are
available for legitimate requests. Distributed DoS (DDoS) attacks in a smart grid employ
compromised meters or appliances and can be used to prevent pricing data from being updated
accurately, leading to inaccurate information about the demand on the system. These attacks are
especially common in the types of wireless implementation common to widespread grids, in
which the scale often makes lower cost equipment and protocol necessary [Zhang, 2011]. The
6

efficiency of the smart grid is reliant on the accurate information about power use and princing,
which is used to determine the amount of power to be generated and the running of various home
appliances to be sure that all aspects of the system run in the most energy and cost effective
manner possible. Inaccurate information from DDoS attacks could become very costly to the
power company or the consumer [Mo, 2012].
2.2 Design of a Secure Cyber System
The traditional approach to the protection of a cyber system is to create a figurative wall
around it, in which the system can’t be entered except by legitimate users [Mukherjee, 1994].
Firewalls are designed to secure the entrances to the system by examining packets as they pass
through and determining whether or not they should be allowed to proceed. This evaluation takes
place using a series of rules to which the packet is compared [Gouda, 2004]. The interface in
which the packet arrives at the firewall, the packet's original source, its final destination, and the
transport protocol it uses are all used to determine whether or not the packet can be allowed
through. Appropriate key management is another important aspect of securing the cyber system
under this approach. Secure key encryption can be a valuable barrier to outside intrusion. The
difficulty with encryption keys in cyber-physical systems is managing them over a large and
varied infrastructure. For instance, most smart meters have a single key for each meter, which
lasts over the life of the device. While this simplifies the management of a large meter system,
the ability to revoke keys and to update them periodically would be a simple step to ensure far
greater security to the entire grid [Hadley, 2010].
It cannot be assumed that such methods will prevent all attackers from gaining entrance,
leaving a need for the design of the communication architecture which achieves maximum
security. The network topology, or the design of the connections between nodes, can be designed
7

to be more resilient to attack. The routing protocol used should be designed to avoid
vulnerabilities in which a single compromised router could bring down the system [Mo, 2011].
Lack of consideration when constructing a communication network leaves the system
unnecessarily vulnerable; it has been shown that the internet is even more vulnerable to attack
than a random network topology would be [Lee, 2006]. In order to design a network topology
that is most robust against cyber attacks, the way in which an attack is spread through the
network must be properly understood. This spread can be modeled in the same way as many
other phenomena, such as rumor routing, or the spread of a virus. Such occurrences have been
studied at length, providing a variety of existing models to choose from. The work of [Roy,
2012] assumes the adversary of the cyber physical system network seeks to measure or modify
points in the network in order to estimate and or actuate the network and attempt to design the
network topology to be more resistant to such measures. The security of the system is measured
in terms of the discoverability of attacks and recoverability of the system in the face of attacks.
When considering spread dynamics for an nth order system with the state space equations

the security of which is considered to be equivalent to the concept of observability in control
theory, or rank {

} = n, where

is the observability matrix defined by

[Roy, 2012] theorizes firstly that the less partial knowledge of the system the attacker
requires the lower the rank of the observability matrix must be. Secondly, they theorize that the
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estimation goal at time state k is secure “if and only if there is a nonzero vector in the range of Ak
that is in the null space of ” [Roy, 2012].
The network’s graph topology can be evaluated in terms of the ease of estimation of its
state and the security of different locations within the network. The spread model can employ
either the probability of an infected node coming into contact with an infected node or by tracing
the infection itself.
Network analysis can also be applied to the design of the power grid to minimize the
damage done by a physical attack. Such design considers power flow to the most crucial system
components and the largest possible disruption to the grid to reduce the damage done [Salmeron,
2004]. Examples include [Salmeron, 2004] and [Pinar, 2010].
2.3 Approaches to Cyber Attack Detection
Traditional cyber defense works to ensure the availability, confidentiality, and integrity
of the cyber system [Mo, 2012]. It seeks to ensure the system is available for use when needed,
that the data in the system cannot be viewed by outsiders without permission, and that the system
data cannot be altered by those without permission. Analysis of the use of the cyber-physical
system can be used to determine likelihood of an intrusion, by invasion or by malicious insider.
There are two categories for intrusion detection, misuse detection and anomaly detection. Misuse
detection is used to search for specific patterns, events or data associated with a known system
weakness and anomaly detection looks at changes in patterns of utilization that can indicate an
attack [Balasubramaniyan, 1998]. Anomaly detection presupposes that an attack on the system
will involve patterns that do not occur during normal system operation, and searches for such
unusual patterns [Denning, 1987]. This has the advantage of being able to detect attacks even if
the system vulnerability is not previously known. The normal behavior patterns in activities such
9

as logins, commands executed, and files and devices accessed can be observed for later
comparison in which a statistically significant anomalous behavior would indicate a possible
attack [Mukherjee, 1994]. A number of approaches to such detection have been developed,
among them agent based intrusion detection and bioinformatics inspired intrusion detection.
In a large scale network, intrusion detection must be adapted from the single detector
model to something better suited analyzing the number of packets used on such a scale. Agent
based intrusion detection was developed to meet this need [Chatzigiannakis, 2004]. Software
agents are designed to operate independently of other programs or user input, in different areas
of the network. In addition to detecting individual attacks across the network, when implemented
properly, agent based intrusion detection can determine when a cooperative intrusion is
occurring across the network [Benattou, 2004]. [Balasubramaniyan, 1998] proposed the intrusion
detection architecture known as Autonomous Agents for Intrusion Detection (AAFID), using a
hierarchal structure of agents to perform detection tasks. Using AAFID, any number of agents
can be distributed over any number of hosts in a network. All agents in a single host report to a
single transceiver, and transceivers report their results to one or more monitors, each of which
oversee several transceivers and perform high level detection through correlating data across the
network. This is not specific to any one detection technique, and can be adapted for different
approaches [Balasubramaniyan, 1998]. Benattou and Tamine combine the concept of a network
of agents with that of mobile agents. Agents are categorized by their varying analysis functions
and can be dispatched by the Specialized Local Agent, or SLA, which is responsible for
coordinating agent activity and determining where different analysis agents are needed. Mobile
Agents collect data, which together with the Correlate Agents determine if attacks are
widespread. Interpreter Agents select specific local events to be considered by the Analyzer
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Agents to detect complex local attacks. This keeps all detection functions from being run at all
times and minimizes the processing power required for the intrusion detection system [Benattou,
2004].
Similar works have been completed by [Helmer, 1998], [Blanc, 2006], [Chatzigiannakis,
2004], and [Zhao-wen, 2007].
One approach to intrusion detection uses a biological model of the immune system’s
response to viral invasion as inspiration for a cyber strategy. There are a variety of immune
based strategies that can be employed, including negative selection algorithms, immune network
algorithms, danger theory, and clonal selection algorithms. In a biological immune system,
antigens, or foreign proteins indicative of a virus or harmful bacteria, are detected by antibodies
chemically binding to the specific part of a protein they are designed to recognize, after which
the antigen is destroyed. These techniques seek to mimic the way in which a biological immune
system trains itself to detect such invaders. One of the easiest to implement examples of this is
the process developed by [Forrest, 1997], in which the specific processes run by a computer were
considered the antigens. Given a collection of digital data to be monitored for changes, a set of
detectors that did not match the data was generated. The detectors were then continuously
compared to the data, and match detectors were used to indicate a change had occurred with a
known location. Like with a biological immune system, matches between the detector and the
data that were close but not precise were also considered matches, and the closeness of the match
was determined using Hamming distances. The primary weakness in this system was the
generation of detectors, which could be improved over a random set using dynamic
programming methods but was still quite imprecise [Forrest, 1997].
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The work of [Zhang, 2011] on artificial immune system (AIS) algorithms is another
example of such method, employing the clonal selection algorithm, a machine learning based
technique that trains the system over time to recognize attacks. The AIS is a machine learning
based system where positive examples alone can be used to train the system to recognize attacks.
The clonal algorithm is based on antigen recognition in the immune system, in which only cells
that recognize the antigens are allowed to reproduce themselves. Immune cells contain a wide
variety of receptors that can bind to a bacterial invader, and so when an attack occurs cells with a
matching receptor will bind to the invader. Cells that bind to a receptor are stimulated to
reproduce, resulting in an immune response prepared to deal with that immune attack. The
CLONALG algorithm is an unsupervised algorithm that uses cycles of maintenance, selection,
cloning and mutation to mimic an immune response and train the system to respond to attacks.
An initial group of ‘antibodies’ is generated randomly and divided into a group of memory cells
and a reservoir pool, as well as a set of antigenic patterns. A single antigen is chosen and
compared to every member of the set of antigens, and the antibodies with the greatest similarities
to the antigen are selected and reproduced in numbers varying linearly with the degree of
similarity between the antibody and antigen. This population is then mutated and again compared
to the antigen. The antibody with the highest affinity is saved and the previous set of antibodies
is replaced by the new group with higher affinity. By repeating this process, a memory pool is
generated that can recognize the desired ‘antigen’. The Artificial Immune Recognition System
(AIRS) builds on the clonal algorithm by the addition of affinity maturation and affinity
recognition balls (ARB). Like CLONALG, AIRS buildings ‘antibodies’ over time, but it differs
in that it is a supervised system. After initialization, AIRS operates in cycles of antigen training,
competition, memory cell selection, and classification of the dataset. In initialization, two sets,
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the ARBs and the memory pool are made after the dataset has been normalized and the variable
for the affinity threshold calculated. Each antigen is then compared to the memory cell pool in
the antigen training step and the best memory cell is selected. Like in the CLONALG, the cell is
then mutated and placed in the ARB pool. The ARB cells with the lowest similarity are
discarded and the ones with the highest go into the memory cell pool. This is then repeated until
all antigens are tested.
The weakness of AIS techniques is the need for a large set of attack samples to be used
during the training process in order to ensure that the system will be able to recognize an attack.
Without a sufficient number, AIS is no more efficient than traditional machine learning
techniques such as support vector machine (SVM). SVM is a machine learning system that uses
large margin separation, in which the distance between a data point and a line drawn to
maximize the distance between the data points on each side of the line separate data into two
separate areas.
These are only a few examples of the use of bioinformatics methods for intrusion
detection. Other examples include the work of researchers such as [Coull, 2003] and
[Janakiraman, 2006].
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Chapter 3: Detection of Compromised Sensors
3.1 Attacks on Sensor Networks
Networks of sensors are useful in a variety of applications, from straightforward
information gathering to large projects such as a smart grid. They are prized for their low cost
and quick deployment, but these same factors make the network vulnerable to incursions such as
node replication attack. Such an attack is considered in terms of the classic mathematical
problem of the Byzantine Generals, first considered by Lamport et al. in 1982 [Vempaty, 2013].
In this problem, a group of generals of the Byzantine Empire work to plan an attack on a city, but
one or more of the generals may be a traitor. Using the information each general reports and the
attack plan suggested by each one, the group must nonetheless come to an accurate consensus as
to the correct information or best attack plan. The same problem applies to a network of sensor
nodes in which some may be either controlled or added by an adversary. Compromised sensors
function much like a traitorous general, impeding the decisions made by the group, as shown in
Figure 3. Node replicas can be used to inject false data into the system, suppress legitimate data,
revoke legitimate nodes and disconnect the network by using the correct protocols [Vempaty,
2013]. For instance, if sensors in a smart grid are made to send false data about the state
estimation of the grid, it will alter decisions made by the grid based on the state estimation data.
This could change power availability to the grid, pricing based on power usage, and charges to
the users [Mo, 2011]. Thus a system must be developed to detect such attacks while also using
low cost hardware.

14

Figure 3: Compromised smart grid with dishonest reports in the network. [Vempaty, 2013]
The two general approaches to detecting node replicas are centralized detection and
localized voting systems. Centralized detection uses a single central point of contact, or fusion
center which receives and processes all claims from sensors and is responsible for determining
whether or not they are compromised, as depicted in Figure 4.

Figure 4: A centralized detection scheme.
This has the advantage over localized voting of being able to detect distributed node
replications more easily. False nodes can also work in unison to better change the consensus
decision of the network, or they can be working independently. If working independently, the
ratio of Byzantine nodes to honest nodes must be at least one half, but if the Byzantine nodes
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work in concert this ratio can be lower and still deceive the network. The more nodes working
together the easier the deception will be to achieve. Similarly, if the attacking nodes are aware of
the true decision they are working against they can better prevent the system from reaching that
conclusion.
3.2 Centralized Detection
There are a variety of approaches to centralized detection, including reputation based
scheme and adaptive learning schemes. A reputation based scheme such as the one developed by
[Rawat, 2011] uses the fusion center to determine a value for each node’s reliability based on
discrepancies between the individual node’s values and input from other nodes. For a system
with sensors transmitting every time instant t, the reputation metric is defined as

after time interval T, where

is the ith sensor’s decision at time instant t,

is the decision

made at the fusion center at that time and is the indicator function over the set S. Thus the greater
the difference between the values the less the node is trusted, and if the pattern holds over time
the node will be trusted less and less. This could be an issue if there are honest outliers in the
nodes readings or if there are communication issues between the node and the fusion center. The
fusion center could become suspicious of a node due to communication issues and has the
potential to eventually drop honest nodes. Reputation based schemes can be problematic if they
do not take into account the possibility of communication errors that can cause readings which
appear suspicious. If the nodes under suspicion are removed from the decision making process,
over time the network can remove many honest nodes due to naturally occurring errors, leaving
few or no nodes left in the system. The combination of reputation based schemes with other
16

security detection strategies to improve the security of the sensor network is discussed further in
Section 3.4.
[Vempaty, 2013] worked on an adaptive learning scheme, in which the system identifies
attacking sensors by comparing their behavior with what would be expected of an honest sensor.
Knowledge of the dishonest sensors and the information they send is used to adapt global
decision making. To determine the behavior expected of an honest sensor, the sensor’s previous
behavior over a period of time must be used to determine the probability of the sensor sending a
one as its value. This demonstrates the most likely behavior of the sensor, which is then used to
determine the likelihood of its honesty later. This has the advantage of working even when
Byzantine sensors are in the majority but can only work if the system has knowledge of the
honest sensor’s behavior. This is a flaw that could prevent it from being useable in many
circumstances; if any behavior deviates from what is expected ahead of time then honest
readings could be unfairly disregarded by the detection system.
The work of [Soltanmohammadi, 2013] describes a centralized detection system that
seeks to identify the nature of a node's false data, in this case termed misbehavior, so that false
data due to attack may be distinguished from false data due to hardware or software degradation.
The source of the node's misbehavior used to determine the type of decision it will make, and by
analyzing the node's decision over time the fusion center can determine whether or not it is the
result of an attack. [Soltanmohammadi, 2014] describes a system for the classification of
misbehavior by cognitive radios based on the expectation maximization algorithm. Assuming
that the majority or the cognitive radios are honest, a set of the CR's decisions in relation to the
hypothesis are used to determine whether or not it is dishonest or not working properly.
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3.3 Distributed Decision Making
The primary flaw of a centralized detection design is that it also makes the system
vulnerable; the whole system fails if the fusion center is compromised. Alternative approaches
involve the collaborative determination of an incursion by the sensor network. More recent
advances in algorithms to detect node replication allow for the collaborative detection of
distributed node replication. One such approach to determining the false node employs the use of
witness nodes to verify the location claims of each sensor node. There are different methods of
selecting witness nodes, including deterministic multicast, randomized multicast, and line
selected multicast. In deterministic multicast, a node broadcasts its location information,
considered a claim until verified, to a deterministically selected set of nodes called witnesses,
which are chosen using the node’s identification number in the network. Therefore, if an
adversary attempts to replicate the node and claim its identification number, the imposter will
broadcast to the same witness nodes, which will be able to find the false node based on the
conflicting claims. In randomized multicast, nodes notify a neighbor of their location claims, and
the neighboring nodes randomly send these location claims to other nodes in the network. In a
network of n nodes, as long as at east

nodes are witnesses to each, the birthday paradox

predicts that there will be a high probability of a collision. This approach is considered more
resilient than the deterministic multicast. An approach with lower communication cost than
randomized multicast is line selected multicast, in which nodes send their location claims in lines
through their neighbors, as shown in Figure 5. This is based on the fact that nodes in sensor
networks work as both sensors and routers, and to send locations claims to other nodes the
information must pass from node to node. Each node sends its location claim to an immediate
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neighbor, which sends the claims to its neighbor, and so on, creating a line of witness nodes
which can detect false claims when the line is crossed.

Figure 5: An illustration of line selected multicast, in which the node α has been replicated as α‘
and neighbors β1, 2 and 3 report location claims to γ, resulting in an intersection at σ. [Parno,
2005]
When considering approaches to distributed detection in terms of their efficiency versus the cost
in memory to each node and communication cost in the system, line selected multicast is the
most efficient system.
Another approach to witness nodes which reduces the necessary memory is the timed
distribution of location claims. In the strategy known as the high noon approach, nodes devote
their computing power to the detection of Byzantine nodes for a periodic length of time t and
then spend the rest of the time on non-detection tasks [Parno, 2005]. During the detection period
nodes determined to be Byzantines have their privileges revoked and then the data is forgotten at
the end of the period. During the next detection period the process begins again. In the time slot
approach, a length of time is divided into units of nodes by their identification number, and
during each period one group of nodes broadcasts their location claims, leaving the network with
a far smaller pool of nodes to check during each time period. All of these techniques are valuable
19

to reduce the necessary equipment costs without impairing the effectiveness of the byzantine
detection system.
3.4 Resilience to False Sensor Claims
Security can also be designed for a sensor network in terms of making it more robust
against node replication attacks, such as noise enhanced signal processing or weighted sequential
ratio probability testing. These are signal processing methods used to increase the likelihood of
accurate sensor data being used regardless of whether or not byzantine nodes have been
identified. While these methods do take into account the likelihood of a sensor being a byzantine,
this is used only for the network to come to a final decision rather than to remove a sensor from
the network, as might occur in a different security strategy. Noise-enhanced signal processing,
such as the work done by [Gagrani, 2011] uses stochastic resonance to make the system more
resistant to Byzantine attack by the introduction of noise. Stochastic resonance is a physical
phenomenon in nonlinear systems in which the signal output can be enhanced by the addition of
noise to the input. This is most helpful to the system when the Byzantine nodes do not also apply
this strategy; using the ratio of honest nodes needed to come to the correct decision as a metric,
stochastic resonance when both the honest and byzantine nodes employ it makes no difference to
the system’s performance. Stochastic resonance can be used in coordination with other metrics to
determine honesty, in which a node deemed honest is told to employ stochastic resonance from
then forward and the nodes under suspicion are not. The stochastic resonance noise can also be
added at the fusion center, as is the case in the model shown in Figure 6. The optimal function of
such a system occurs is dependent on the system’s knowledge of the channel state information
and the local sensor detection performance indices. The approach which requires the least
information is the equal gain combiner, or ECG.
20

Figure 6: Inference network model for stochastic resonance added at the fusion center. [Gagrani,
2011]
Though it does not have a performance as good as other stochastic resonance approaches,
addition at the fusion center can still be a valid approach depending on the circumstances under
which the system operates. As a whole, noise enhanced signal processing is primarily of interest
in addition to other approaches to sensor network security rather than as a singular method of
protection, but when used in conjunction with a robust method of byzantine detection it can be
valuable.
Weighted sequential probability ratio test (WSPRT) is another method to make the sensor
network more robust to attack. One example of WSPRT is the work of [Chen, 2008], which
considers the detector design and the data fusion process using WSPRT in cognitive radio
network sensor systems. WSPRT has two steps; the first is a reputation based action and the
second is the hypothesis test. The reputation step is similar to other reputation schemes in that it
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judges the accuracy and honesty of a sensor based on how closely its data reflects the final local
decision. The second step is based on the Sequential Probability Ratio Test (SPRT), a hypothesis
test used for sequential analysis which allows for the sampling of a variable number of
operations [Chen, 2008]. In a non-adversarial environment, SPRT has both bounded false alarm
probability and bounded miss detection probability. WSPRT is essentially SPRT with the
reputation of the sensors taken into account. The likelihood ratio of SPRT is defined as

where H1 and H0 are the hypotheses to be chosen between. The likelihood ratio of WSPRT is
defined as

where wi is the weight of Ni and is a function of ri, the reputation value of sensor Ni,

.

When designing f several factors must be taken into account, including outputting

,

accepting arbitrary ri values and giving proper weight to even those sensors which have a slightly
negative reputation metric, since a slightly low reputation could be due to factors such as
temporary interference. [Chen, 2008] use the function

where g is a number greater than zero which increases with each decision and is selected to
ensure that sensors are weighted properly based on their reputation.
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Because it incorporates a reputation scheme, WSPRT is only as effective as the
reputation scheme it is based on. With correct evaluation of the reputation metric and selection of
the weighting function this can be a valuable method of analyzing sensor data.
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Chapter 4: Security in Control System
4.1 Attacks on Control Systems
Like other cyber-physical systems, control systems are vulnerable to malicious attacks in
the form of deception or denial-of-service (DoS) attacks. DoS attacks can be used in cyberphysical control systems with communication systems which can be jammed, leading sensor and
control packets to be dropped [Amin, 2009]. As shown in [Long, 2005], DoS attacks cause a
significant increase in overshoot, settling time, rise time, and error. Designing the control system
with safety constraints that reduce its vulnerability is one straightforward way of protecting from
DoS attack [Amin, 2009]. Deception attacks occur through compromising the integrity of the
control system’s sensor and control data packets, resulting in the receipt of false data which the
system believes to be true. This data can be used to cause the system to damage itself or to
manipulate its function for the benefit of the attacker. Through the use of filtering this signal
insertion can be detected and dealt with. Detection becomes more difficult in the case of a replay
attack, in which false sensor readings are relayed to the controller, disguising the sensor data
which could be used to detect the insertion. Such an attack is depicted in Figure 7. The system
becomes open loop without input from the system’s sensors, so the performance of the control
system can no longer be guaranteed. This also leaves the system vulnerable to other attacks that
cannot be detected while the sensor data is obfuscated. The most straightforward method of
disguise is to record the sensors’ previous data and play it back to the system, but this can also be
done using sensor data generated to resemble normal operations without duplicating it exactly
[Mo, 2009].
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Figure 7: System diagram of a replay attack.
Replay attacks had only been theorized before the use of the Stuxnet worm against
nuclear facilities in Iran [Chabukswar, 2011]. Stuxnet highlighted the vulnerability of cyberphysical infrastructure in general and in control systems in particular and brought new urgency to
the research into protection against replay attacks.
4.2 Protecting Against Denial-of-Service Attacks
The first line of defense against DoS attack in control systems is a design that minimizes
the danger due to packet drop. [Long, 2005] suggest a straightforward method of DoS detection
which assumes any packet load over a certain threshold outside of normal operating procedure to
be a DoS attack. Once this threshold is cleared, the router begins to increase the probability of
packet drop. This was shown through simulation to greatly mitigate the effects of DoS attack
[Long, 2005].
[Amin, 2009] consider optimal controller design in the presence of DoS attack for the
case of a linear time invariant (LTI) stochastic system
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over time horizon k=0,…, N-1 and with measurement and control packets (

) subject to DoS

attacks. The authors sought to produce a causal feedback control law that for the given system
would minimize the finite horizon objective function

where for

and

and power constraints in an expected sense on both the state and input

and safety specification probabilistic constraints on state and input

The system is analyzed under the Bernoulli packet drop model, in which the system is subjected
to an attacker randomly jamming a measurement or control packet according to independent
Bernoulli trials and with a probability of success

and

respectively. The attack has the

admissible attack actions

The use of Kalman filter for state estimate
leads

and state estimation error

to

the
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update

step

and correction step

leading to Kalman filter equations

The optimal control model for the Bernoulli attack case is found to be
taken from the Kalman filter equations and
and

with
with

. It is also noted that an attacker may apply an

optimal attack instead, having no incentive to comply with a Bernoulli model of attack,
complicating the ability to design a controller to handle such an attack.
4.3 Detection of Signal Insertion
Many different approaches have been taken to the filtering of malicious signal insertion
in a control system. Mo and Sinopoli evaluated the ‘attackability’ of a control system with a
sensor network evaluating its state and a χ2 failure detector, [Mo, 2010]. By evaluating the way
in which the system fails under different types of attacks they were able to determine that the
failure detector would sound immediately in a case of an attack that injects large values. They
were also able to determine that through evaluation of unstable eigenvectors sensors needed by
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an attacker in order to cause the network to fail could be identified, providing a way to increase
system reliability by increasing the number of sensor nodes along those vectors.
Pasqualetti et al developed a centralized filter based on a modified Luenberger observer
designed to detect attacks in a control system [Pasqualetti 2012, Part II]. Given a time invariant
system

where E is a possibly singular matrix and

and

describe unknown signals attributed

to disturbances affecting the plant. The centralized attack detection filter

where w(0) = x(0) and output injection gain G is such that the pair (E, A+GC) is regular and
Hurwitz. If

at all times then it can be concluded that

at all times. In the

absence of attacks, the error e(t) = w(t)-x(t) is exponentially stable.
Pasqualetti et al have also developed a distributed attack detection system in control systems,
employing knowledge of the decentralized stabilization of the filter’s error dynamics and the
waveform relaxation method to produce a distributed attack detection filter. The decentralized
system is the interconnection of N subsystems with the state and output
neighbors

for the i-th subsystem. It can be represented by

Each subnetwork with control center

has the local residual generator
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and

and

where

where

is the i-th estimate of

. This gives the overall filter dynamics of

when

Waveform relaxation is used to obtain the waveform relaxation iteration

where k is the iteration index. This leads to the distributed attack detection filter

Similar to the case of the centralized filter,

at all times if and only if

at all times, and without the presence of an attack, the asymptotic filter error
is exponentially stable [Pasqualetti, 2012, Part II].
4.4 Detection of Replay Attacks
While many studies assume, perhaps falsely, that failure in a control system is due to
random events or benign ones, the issue of failure due to an attack must be considered differently
than in the typical failure detection algorithm. Mo and Sinopoli developed one technique to
detect replay data in a linear time invariant (LTI) Gaussian system with an infinite horizon
Linear Quadratic Gaussian (LQG) Controller, assuming the system has a χ 2 failure detector [Mo,
2009]. One strategy to detect replay attacks is to inject time-stamped noise into the system. The
LTI system’s dynamics at time k are described as
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where wk is the process noise with Gaussian distribution and x0 is the initial state. The network is
assumed to be monitored by a sensor network with observation equation

where yk is the vector of measurements from the sensors and vk is the measurement noise with
Gaussian distribution. The system uses a Kalman filter, the optimal estimator for such a system,
providing the minimum variance unbiased estimate of state, denoted by
estimate of

indicating the

based on measurements up to time k. Because Kalman gain converges over time

and control systems run for long period, it is assumed that to be in a steady state, and that the
Kalman filter will be a fixed gain estimator. An LQG controller is designed for systems in the
presence of the Gaussian noise, and is the result of a Linear Quadratic Estimator (LQE), or
Kalman filter, with a Linear Quadratic Regulator (LQR). The controller works by minimizing the
function

based on the state estimation

where

. This minimization leads to the fixed gain controller

is the optimal control input. The system uses a failure detector which operates by

detecting when the normalized estimation error rises above a certain probability threshold,
indicating that an error has occurred. For a replay attack, it is assumed that an attacker can inject
a control signal at any time, knows all of the sensor readings, and can modify them. This leads to
the conclusion that given these capabilities the attacker will first record a period of sensor data
and then replay it to the system while injecting a sequence of desired control input. The injected
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signal could also be generated through observation of legitimate values and machine learning to
resemble accurate data without actually being a replay of previous recordings. In either case the
attack would be disguised by the false data. The controller is redesigned to reflect this, and
becomes

where

is the optimal LQG control signal and

and zero mean and is independent of
and the system with the addition of

is taken from an i.i.d. Gaussian distribution

[Mo 2009]. The covariance of

is indicated by

,

is depicted in Figure 8.

Figure 8: System with insertion of authentication signal. [Mo, 2011]
It functions as an authentication signal, though it does mean that there is a loss of
performance as a result of its addition to the optimal LQG signal.
The expectation of the normalized error covariance while not under attack is

when under attack expectation is asymptotically given by

where

is the solution to the Lyapunov equation
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The asymptotic expectation can be used to set a threshold for failure detection, in which
values that rise above the set threshold indicate that the system is under attack. The value set for
the threshold varies by the importance placed on detection rate versus false alarm rate. The
greater the covariance is set to the greater the detection rate and the loss of performance will be.
In order to achieve a detection rate of over 35%, the covariance must be 0.6, which means a
sacrifice in performance of 91% with respect to the optimal performance [Mo, 2009].
Chabukswar, Mo and Sinopoli developed ways to improve on this sacrifice in performance by
optimizing the covariance according to the desired performance constraints, but there is still
great loss of performance [Chabukswar, 2011].
To improve on this loss of performance, [Miao, 2010] developed a game theoretic
approach to replay attacks designed to minimize losses due to detection. Like Mo and Sinopoli,
Miao et al consider the case of a LTI system with a LQG Controller, and a χ2 failure detector. In
this case, however, the authors design a system in which two controllers are switched between
depending on the system dynamics. One is the optimal controller which operates without the
addition of

and thus no loss of performance, and one is the controller designed by Mo and

Sinopoli for replay attack detection with the addition of

. The controller is chosen by

considering the system and the attacker as opponents within a game theory framework with a
game divided into K stages corresponding to the time steps n considered in the previous work.
Within the game, the attacker is considered the maximizer, or row player, and the system is
considered the minimizer, or column player. Both may view the current state of the game but
neither has complete knowledge of the other player’s previous decisions. If the detector alarm is
triggered by the attacker than the system is considered to have won, but the system is strictly
penalized for false alarms. The game space with three game states is denoted

32

and

the action spaces are

for the attacker and

for the system. The game states are shown in

Figure 9. In each stage k the attacker’s action space
space

includes m options and the system action

has two, the two controller options. The safe space, in which the system has detected

an attack, is denoted

. The no detection space in which no alarm has been triggered is

the state for a false alarm being triggered is

and

.

Figure 9: The stochastic game model developed by [Miao, 2010], with s1 in an absorbing state.
The state transition probability matrix is

,

is the immediate payoff matrix, and the

set strategies in each state k of the attacker and system for each system state are
state transition probability

is determined by

and

, the probability provided by the

detector of an alarm being set off and changing the system state given the system history
stage k with strategies

and

and probability that system is at state

probability of the system being at state

. The

given as

. At
, the

in stage k+1 is

These can be used to determine an optimal game strategy based on the state of the game
and the expected payoff and a suboptimal game strategy which does not require knowledge of
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the previous history of actions. Use of the suboptimal strategy can be shown to improve the
control cost by approximately fifty percent compared to using only the controller with constant
detection while the detection rate only decreases by approximately five percent when switching
between controllers. The addition of game theoretic strategy increases the performance of the
control system, but a trade-off between effectiveness of detection and function remains. The
improvement in control cost is greater than the loss in detection rate, but given the initial
detection rate still leaves room for improvement.
An alternate strategy for the detection of replay attacks using the addition of time
stamped noise while reducing the loss of performance was proposed by [Tran, 2013] for use in
smart grids. When applying the additional noise to the smart grid there will be discrepancies
between the power usage and the usage that is measured by smart meters and possibly lead to a
waste of power. To reduce this loss, this technique calls for the random signal to be added
periodically for a relatively small span of time, allowing equipment to operate normally during
the longer periods in which the signal has not been added.
Chabukswar, Mo and Sinopoli also worked on another approach to intrusion detection in
the case of power grids, in which sudden problem with load could easily be due to changes in
demand rather than an attack or a faulty sensor, making the Gaussian noise previously proposed
by Mo and Sinopoli impractical. A wide sense stationary (WSS) Gaussian authentication signal
is added to the set point of the generator while the controller runs a model of the generator and
the effect of the new signal of the grid frequency. The actual grid frequency is then observed and
changes are compared to the predicted change from the added signal. If the correlation is 0, the
absence of the authentication signal is easily detected, signaling an attack on the system
[Chabukswar, 2011].
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These replay attack detection techniques, while an improvement over approaches that do
not take the sensor data obfuscation of replay attacks into account, still do not adequately address
the danger such attacks present, particularly given the loss of efficiency that results. Further
directions of investigations should address these issues.
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Chapter 5: Conclusion
5.1 Summary of Thesis
There are many avenues of attack through which a cyber-physical system may be
vulnerable, and protection for each of those routes must be provided for. We have approached
these avenues divided into the system that must be defended against.
The study of traditional cyber attacks was outlined in Chapter 2, which covered the ways
of ensuring the integrity, availability, and confidentiality of the system. Cyber systems are
vulnerable DoS attacks and network attacks that can be used to access unauthorized information,
alter information within the system, or directly damage the system function. The system can be
designed to be robust in the face of an attack through the correct use of keys and network
topology can help protect the system. Incursions to the system can be detected by monitoring of
quantified and learned values of system function for anomalous use indicative of an unauthorized
use.
Chapter 3 discussed the security of sensor networks. Sensor networks are vulnerable to
the addition of false nodes, the control of an honest node by an attacker to make it behave
dishonestly, and the manipulation of the environment around a sensor to cause it to provide
incorrect data. Such incursions can be detected in a sensor network through the examination of
the values given by the sensors. Using these values as provided by sensors across the network
over time, the reliability of individual sensors in the network can be evaluated. This can be
evaluated by a single centralized decision maker or across the network by nodes acting together.
Sensor values can also be weighted to provide maximum resilience to false node claims.
Chapter 4 covered the protection of control systems from damage or manipulation due to
the DoS attacks, insertion of malicious signals, and deception through data readings used to
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disguise an attack. Designing the system to minimize the damage caused by packet drop helps to
detect against DoS attack. Appropriate filters can be used to detect signal insertion, but defense
against replay attacks remain challenging, requiring the insertion of time-stamped noise which
destabilizes the system. Switching between such a system and a more stable control system
based on a game theoretic model allows the system performance and attack detection to be
optimized. These attack detection and secure system design approaches may be combined to
combat attack, ensuring, dependent on what attacks a system might face, a robust defense for
cyber-physical systems can be developed.
5.2 Cyber-Physical Security Outlook
Despite the great strides made in the field of cyber-physical security, many weaknesses in
the defensive approaches must be dealt with more thoroughly. Future research in cyber-physical
security may address issues such as the reduction of cost and computing power necessary to
detect attacks, improvement of system performance while attack detection is in operation, or the
adaptation of existing security approaches to new or more specific kinds of cyber-physical
systems. Some improvements in security are simply a matter of integrating known methods of
protection to the systems currently in use.
Cyber security has a great deal of completed work in identification and defense from
network attacks, but remains vulnerable to malicious attack by insiders and to denial-of-service
attacks. Weaknesses in network topology have yet to be fully addressed. The internet has been
shown to be even more vulnerable to path based attacks such as DoS [Lee, 2006], demonstrating
that the great potential of a system whose network topology has not been optimized for security
to be exploited by an attacker. While the need for this work has been shown [Lee, 2006], more
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research must be completed in determining the optimum network topology for different types of
attacks, including both DoS attacks and physical attacks such as physical sabotage to equipment.
A large portion of the research into sensor network security works well in optimal
conditions, but has a tendency to false alarms due communication errors that occur in real world
conditions. This leads to the expulsion of normally functioning sensors. Further work should be
done on techniques that take such normal errors into account. An additional weakness in the field
is that while detection of smaller numbers of false nodes in a sensor network is well documented,
the protection of the network when a larger proportion of nodes are false becomes more difficult
as the number of false nodes increases. A future direction of research in sensor networks is the
detection of attack in the case of larger scale attacks.
Design of a controller in the presence of a non-optimal DoS attack has been formulated,
but the formulation of such a controller in the face of an ideal attack strategy is more
challenging. There is still a great deal of research to be done on the design of control systems to
be resilient to DoS attacks in which the attacker has knowledge of the system and is attacking in
the optimal way to cause damage to the system. Detection and design strategies for signal
insertion to control systems have been well developed, but control systems are still vulnerable to
replay attack. The best of current strategies have a low success rate and significant loss of
function. In the area of detecting replay attacks in control systems, the improvement of the
system performance when attempting to detect replay attacks is crucial to its functionality in real
use. The improvement of system functionality when incorporating an added signal for time
verification is crucial to the practical use of such techniques. Improvement of the rate of
detection of such a system would also be valuable.
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